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a b s t r a c t
Single-peaked preferences are important throughout social choice theory. In this article,we
consider single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternative spaces—that
is, alternative spaces of the form {0, 1}n for some integer n ≥ 2. We show that preferences
that are single-peaked with respect to a normalized separable base order are nonseparable
except in the most trivial cases. We establish that two distinct base orders can induce the
same single-peaked preference order if any only if they differ by a transposition of their two
central elements. We then use this result to enumerate single-peaked binary preference
orders over a separable base order.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Single-peaked preferences are important throughout social choice theory, perhaps most famously because of their use
in the well-known Median Voter Theorem [2,14]. Intuitively, a voter is said to have single-peaked preferences if there is an
ideal outcome that they prefer the most, and alternatives that are further away from this ideal outcome (according to some
linear ordering) are less preferred. The notion of preferences being single-peaked assumes, in essence, a one-dimensional
set of alternatives. However, alternative spaces are sometimes multidimensional. For instance, in referendum elections,
voters are often required to vote simultaneously on multiple questions or proposals. For an election on n ≥ 2 proposals,
the set of possible outcomes is not only multidimensional, but discrete as well; in particular, each outcome is an element of
{0, 1}n—that is, an ordered n-tuple of zeros and ones.
Although there has been some research onmultidimensional analogs of single-peaked preferences (see, for instance, [1]),
little work has done within the specific context of multidimensional, binary alternative spaces. Golenbiewski, Hodge, and
Moats [7] studied cost-conscious voters—that is, voters who wish to limit total spending to a fixed amount—in referendum
elections. Their formulation of cost-consciousness yields preferences that are single-peaked with respect to cost. Here we
develop a more general model and consider its practical and theoretical implications.
In Section 2, we define the notion of single-peaked preferences for multidimensional binary alternative spaces. We then
explore the relationship between our model and the notion of cost-consciousness proposed by Golenbiewski et al. [7].
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In Section 3, we discuss separability of multidimensional preferences, and in Section 4, we relate separability to single-
peakedness. In Section 5, we prove several structural results, and we use these results to enumerate single-peaked binary
preference orders over a separable base order. In Section 6, we summarize our work and suggest directions for further
research.
2. Single-peaked preferences and cost-consciousness
We begin by adopting a slight variation of the preference model used by Bradley, Hodge, and Kilgour [3], which is based
on that of Yu [16]. We assume the context of a decision problem on a finite criteria set Q = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where n ≥ 2. By
an alternative, we mean an element of {0, 1}n—that is, an n-tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where xi ∈ {0, 1} for each i.1 We denote
by X the set of all such alternatives, noting that |X | = 2n. If S is a nonempty, proper subset of Q and x ∈ X , then we let xS
denote the components of x corresponding to the criteria in S. In this way, we can denote any alternative x ∈ X by (xS, x−S),
where−S denotes the complement of S in Q . We use the notations 0S and 1S to denote the |S|-tuples consisting of all zeros
or all ones, so that, for example, (1S, 0−S) denotes the alternative x for which xi = 1 for all i ∈ S and xi = 0 for all i ∉ S.
Example 1. Let Q = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider the alternative x = 1010, and let S = {1, 3}. Then xS = x{1,3} = 11 and
x−S = x{2,4} = 00. Thus, x = (1S, 0−S).
A strict total order on X is called a binary preference order for Q . We typically use the symbols≪ and≺ to denote binary
preference orders (and≫ and ≻ to denote their respective inverse orders). When we write x ≼ y, we mean that x ≺ y or
x = y. The symbols≽,≤≤, and≥≥ are defined similarly.
The binary preference orders of interest to us here are those that are single-peaked, defined formally as follows.
Definition 1. Let≪ and≺ be binary preference orders for Q , and label the elements xi of X so that
x1 ≪ x2 ≪ · · · ≪ x2n−1 ≪ x2n .
Then≺ is said to be single-peaked with respect to≪ if there exists an alternative x∗ = xk ∈ X such that
x1 ≺ x2 ≺ · · · xk−1 ≺ x∗ ≻ xk+1 ≻ · · · ≻ x2n−1 ≻ x2n .
In this case, x∗ is said to be the peak for≺.
Note that Definition 1 implies that≺ is single-peaked with respect to≪ if and only if≺ is single-peaked with respect to
≫ (the inverse of≪).
Example 2. Let Q = {1, 2, 3}, and let≪ be the binary preference order defined by
000≪ 100≪ 010≪ 001≪ 110≪ 101≪ 011≪ 111.
Let≺ be the binary preference order defined by
111 ≺ 011 ≺ 101 ≺ 000 ≺ 100 ≺ 010 ≺ 001 ≺ 110.
Then≺ is single-peaked with respect to≪, with peak x∗ = 110, since
000 ≺ 100 ≺ 010 ≺ 001 ≺ 110 ≻ 101 ≻ 011 ≻ 111.
Although single-peaked preferences have applications throughout social choice theory, the primary motivation for the
presentwork comes from the context ofmultiple-question referendum elections, and specifically the study of cost-conscious
voters within such elections. In this context, Q represents a set of yes–no questions or proposals, so that each x ∈ X denotes
a possible election outcome, with a 1 in the ith component of x denoting passage of proposal i and a 0 denoting failure.
In this context, Golenbiewski et al. [7] conceptualized cost-conscious voters as those who support each proposal in
principle but desire to limit total spending to some fixed amount or cost ceiling. The model developed by Golenbiewski
et al. naturally yields single-peaked preferences with respect to cost—that is, with respect to the order≪ in which x ≪ y if
and only if the total cost of passing outcome x is less than the total cost of passing outcome y. In particular, a cost-conscious
voter’s total utility increasesmonotonicallywith cost up to the voter’s cost ceiling, and then decreasesmonotonically beyond
that point. Thus, any cost-conscious voter can be viewed as having single-peaked preferences, with the peak occurring at
the outcome whose cost is closest to, but does not exceed, the voter’s cost ceiling.
It is important to note that the model of cost-consciousness proposed by Golenbiewski et al. is significantly more
restrictive than Definition 1, in that it requires all outcomes whose costs exceed the cost ceiling to be less preferred than
1 For ease of notation, we will often omit parentheses and commas, writing, for example, 1101 instead of (1, 1, 0, 1). We will also use the notation xi in
two distinct ways: (i) to denote the ith component of alternative x; and (ii) to denote the ith element of a sequence of alternatives. The context will make
clear which meaning is intended.
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all outcomes whose costs do not exceed the cost ceiling. Note that Definition 1 imposes no such requirement. Indeed, while
Definition 1 requires that xi ≺ xj whenever xi ≪ xj ≪ x∗ or x∗ ≪ xj ≪ xi, there is no requirement with regard to the
relative ordering of xi and xj when xi ≪ x∗ ≪ xj—that is, when xi and xj are on opposite sides of the peak. Thus, single-
peaked preferences in the context of referendum elections provide a more robust and flexible model of cost-consciousness.
3. Separability
Note that every binary preference order is single-peaked with respect to itself, with the peak at x2n . Therefore, any
meaningful attempt to characterize or enumerate collections of single-peaked preferences must focus on preferences that
are single-peaked with respect to an underlying order that satisfies certain reasonable restrictions. For our purposes, we
will impose the condition of separability, defined formally as follows.
Definition 2. Let≪ be a binary preference order for Q , and let S be a nonempty, proper subset of Q . Then S is said to be
separablewith respect to≪, or simply≪-separable, provided that
(xS, u−S)≪ (yS, u−S) for some xS, yS, u−S
implies
(xS, v−S)≪ (yS, v−S) for all v−S .
If each nonempty S ⊂ Q is separable with respect to≪, then≪ is said to be completely separable, or simply separable.
Separability is important in many fields, including economics, political science, operations research, and computer
science. (See [9] for a summary.) Intuitively, an agent’s preferences are separable if they do not exhibit dimensional
interdependencies—that is, if the agent’s preferences over the alternatives on each criterion or set of criteria do not depend
on the choice of alternatives on other criteria. The next example illustrates the definition of separability.
Example 3. Let Q ,≪, and ≺ be as defined in Example 2. Note that 010 ≺ 110 but 101 ≺ 001. Letting S = {1}, u−S = 10,
and v−S = 01, we see that (0, u−S) ≺ (1, u−S) but (1, v−S) ≺ (0, v−S). Thus,≺ is not separable. In contrast,≪ is completely
separable, since for each nonempty, proper subset S of Q and each v−S, (0S, v−S)≪ (1S, v−S).
From this point forward, we will focus our attention on preferences that are single-peaked with respect to an underlying
base order ≪ that is both separable and satisfies a normalization condition—namely that
(0S, v−S)≪ (1S, v−S)
for all nonempty S ⊂ Q and all v−S (as in Example 3).We incur no loss of generality by restricting our attention to normalized
base orders. In addition, normalization is consistentwith the assumption of Golenbiewski et al. [7] that cost-conscious voters
support all proposals in principle. Finally, defining a base order to be separable allows us to isolate the nonseparability
that is induced by single-peakedness—which, as we will see shortly, is significant even when the underlying base order is
completely separable.
The next definition states our assumptions formally.
Definition 3. A base order for Q is a separable binary preference order≪ for Q such that
(0S, v−S)≪ (1S, v−S)
for all nonempty S ⊂ Q and all v−S . A binary preference order ≺ is said to be single-peaked if there exists a base order≪
such that≺ is single-peaked with respect to≪.
It is a simple consequence of Definition 3 that if≺ is a single-peaked binary preference order for Q , then either 0Q or 1Q
is minimal with respect to≺.
4. Single-peaked preferences, separability, and voting
Before moving on to the task of enumerating single-peaked preference orders, wewill first note a few basic results about
single-peaked preferences, all of which are generalizations of results from Golenbiewski et al. [7]. The first elaborates on
our earlier claim that single-peaked preferences can be highly nonseparable, even though the underlying base orders are
completely separable. Its proof relies on a straightforward lemma.
Lemma 1. Let ≺ be a binary preference order for Q . Then a nonempty subset S ⊂ Q is separable with respect to≺ if and only if
S is separable with respect to≻ (the inverse of ≺). Consequently,≺ is separable if and only if ≻ is separable.
Theorem 1. Let ≪ be a base order for Q , and let ≺ be single-peaked with respect to≪, with peak x∗.
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(i) The order ≺ is completely separable if and only if x∗ = 0Q or x∗ = 1Q .
(ii) If x∗ ∉ {0Q , 1Q }, then a nonempty subset S ⊂ Q is separable with respect to≺ only if
• x∗ ≪ (1S, 0−S); or
• yS = 1S for all y ≥≥ x∗.
Proof. For (i), we begin with the reverse implication. If x∗ = 1Q , then ≺=≪, and so ≺ is separable. If x∗ = 0Q , then ≺
is the inverse of≪, and is thus separable by Lemma 1. For the forward implication, suppose x∗ ≠ 0Q and x∗ ≠ 1Q . Then
x∗ = (1S, 0−S) for some nonempty, proper subset S of Q . Since≪ is normalized, it follows that either
(0S, 0−S)≪ (0S, 1−S)≪ x∗ = (1S, 0−S)≪ (1S, 1−S)
or
(0S, 0−S)≪ x∗ = (1S, 0−S)≪ (0S, 1−S)≪ (1S, 1−S).
In the first case, Definition 1 implies that
(1S, 1−S) ≺ (1S, 0−S) and (0S, 0−S) ≺ (0S, 1−S),
which implies that−S is not separable with respect to≺. In the second case, Definition 1 implies that
(1S, 1−S) ≺ (0S, 1−S) and (0S, 0−S) ≺ (1S, 0−S),
which implies that S is not separable with respect to ≺. In either case, there exists a proper, nonempty subset S of Q such
that S is not separable with respect to≺.
For (ii), suppose that x∗ ∉ {0Q , 1Q }, and let S be a nonempty, proper subset of Q . Suppose, to the contrary, that S is
separable with respect to≺, (1S, 0−S) ≤≤ x∗, and yS ≠ 1S for some y ≥≥ x∗. Since≪ is separable and normalized,
(vS, 0−S)≪ (1S, 0−S) ≤≤ x∗ for all vS ≠ 1S .
Thus, Definition 1 implies that
(vS, 0−S) ≺ (1S, 0−S) for all vS ≠ 1S . (1)
Now consider two cases.
Case 1: x∗S ≠ 1S . In this case, x∗ ≤≤ (x∗S , 1−S)≪ (1S, 1−S), which implies that
(1S, 1−S) ≺ (x∗S , 1−S). (2)
Since x∗S ≠ 1S , (1) implies that
(x∗S , 0−S) ≺ (1S, 0−S). (3)
But then (2) and (3) together contradict the≺-separability of S.
Case 2: x∗S = 1S . In this case, x∗−S ≠ 1−S (since x∗ ≠ 1Q ). Thus,
x∗ = (1S, x∗−S)≪ (1S, 1−S).
By assumption, there exists y = (yS, y−S) ∈ X with yS ≠ 1S such that x∗ ≤≤ y. Thus,
x∗ = (1S, x∗−S)≪ (yS, y−S)≪ (1S, 1−S). (4)
Since yS ≠ 1S , (1) implies that
(yS, 0−S) ≺ (1S, 0−S). (5)
If y−S = 1−S , then (4) implies that
(1S, 1−S) ≺ (yS, 1−S) = (yS, y−S). (6)
But then (5) and (6) together contradict the≺-separability of S.
Now suppose y−S ≠ 1−S . Since yS ≠ 1S , the normalization of≪ implies that
x∗ = (1S, x∗−S)≪ (yS, y−S)≪ (yS, 1−S)≪ (1S, 1−S). (7)
By Definition 1, it follows that
(1S, 1−S) ≺ (yS, 1−S). (8)
But then (5) and (8) together contradict the≺-separability of S. Since each case leads to a contradiction, the proof is complete.
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Theorem 1 implies that single-peaked preferences exhibit some degree of nonseparability except in the trivial cases
where the peak is either minimal or maximal with respect to ≪. For example, consider any preference order ≻ that is
single-peaked with respect to the base order
000≪ 100≪ 010≪ 001≪ 110≪ 101≪ 011≪ 111,
with peak x∗ = 101. The only nonempty subsets of {1, 2, 3} that could possibly be separable with respect to ≻ are {2, 3}
and {3}, since these are the only sets that meet the conditions in part (ii) of Theorem 1.
In the context of referendum elections, nonseparability has been shown to lead to unsatisfactory and even paradoxical
election results, such as an outcome that is the least preferred choice of every voter. (See, for example, [4,5,7,11,13].) In spite
of the possibility of selecting poor outcomes due to the nonseparability of single-peaked preferences, the Median Voter
Theorem [2,14] implies that, for electorates whose members all have single-peaked preferences over a common base order,
there is always at least one outcome—in particular, aweak Condorcet winner2—that voters will view favorably in comparison
to other alternatives. Likewise, for any electorate consisting entirely of voterswith single-peakedpreferences, there is always
a weak Condorcet loser—in our case, either 0Q or 1Q . (Note that these results hold not only for multidimensional binary
preferences, but in more general contexts as well.) The challenge, then, is to design election mechanisms that select the
former and avoid the latter, thereby minimizing the detrimental effects of nonseparability.
5. Enumeration of single-peaked preferences
In this section, we will turn our attention to the problem of enumerating single-peaked preference orders. In general,
counting problems associatedwith separable preferences tend to be difficult. For instance, there is no known closed formula
for the number of separable binary preference orders as a function of n, and exact counts are known only for n ≤ 7 (see [10]).
Our goal here is not to address the problem of counting separable preference orders. Rather, we will determine the number
of single-peaked binary preference orders as a function of both n and an additional parameter pn, which denotes the number
of normalized, separable base orders for a criteria set of cardinality n.
We begin by counting the number of single-peaked preference orders corresponding to any given base order.
Definition 4. Let ≪ be a binary preference order for Q . For all x ∈ X , define X≪(x) = {y ∈ X : y ≪ x} and
X≫(x) = {y ∈ X : x ≪ y}. Then the≪-position of x, denoted pos≪(x), is given by
pos≪(x) = |X≪(x)| + 1 = |{y ∈ X : y ≪ x}| + 1.
Note that 1 ≤ pos≪(x) ≤ 2n, with theminimum andmaximum elements of X (with respect to≪) assuming the extreme
values. Also note that if we label the elements xi of X so that
x1 ≪ x2 ≪ · · · ≪ x2n−1 ≪ x2n ,
then pos≪(xi) = i. Finally, the order≪ is uniquely determined by the sequence of≪-positions assigned to the elements of
X .
When comparing the positions of an alternative x with respect to two orders, say≪1 and≪2, we will often abbreviate
pos≪1(x) and pos≪2(x) by pos1(x) and pos2(y), respectively. For any base order≪, we let SP(≪) denote the set of all binary
preference orders that are single-peaked with respect to≪.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2 in Escoffier et al. [6].
Theorem 2. Let ≪ be a base order for Q , where |Q | = n. Then
|SP(≪)| = 22n−1.
If the sets SP(≪1) and SP(≪2) were disjoint whenever ≪1 ≠ ≪2, then counting the number of single-peaked
preferences would be as simple as multiplying 22
n−1 by the number of base orders for Q . Unfortunately, however, it is
possible for SP(≪1) and SP(≪2) to intersect nontrivially, as demonstrated in the next example.
Example 4. Let |Q | = 3, and let≪1 and≪2 be the base orders defined by
000≪1 100≪1 010≪1 001≪1 110≪1 101≪1 011≪1 111
and
000≪2 100≪2 010≪2 110≪2 001≪2 101≪2 011≪2 111.
2 Aweak Condorcetwinner is an outcome thatwould tie or defeat any other outcome in a head-to-head contest decided bymajority rule.Weak Condorcet
losers are defined analogously. We consider weak Condorcet winners and losers to allow for the possibility of ties.
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Then the order≺ defined by
111 ≺ 011 ≺ 101 ≺ 000 ≺ 100 ≺ 010 ≺ 001 ≺ 110
is single-peakedwith respect to both≪1 and≪2, with peak x∗ = 110. Thus, SP(≪1)∩SP(≪2) ≠ ∅, even though≪1 ≠ ≪2.
When SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2) ≠ ∅, we say that≪1 and≪2 overlap. We now turn our attention to the task of characterizing
the ways in which distinct base orders can overlap.
First, we note that the symmetric group S2n acts on the set of all binary preference orders for Q by permuting the
positions of the elements. (See [8] for an extensive treatment of permutations acting on separable preference orders.) In
particular, if σ ∈ S2n and ≪ is a binary preference order for Q , then we define σ(≪) to be the ordering ≪′ for which
pos≪′(x) = σ(pos≪(x)) for all x ∈ X . We call τc = (2n−1, 2n−1 + 1) the central transposition. (Note that τc , when applied
to a preference order, simply swaps the positions of the middle two elements.) Using this notation, we can observe that, in
Example 4,≪2 = τc(≪1). This observation is a consequence of the following more general result.
Theorem 3. Let ≪1 and≪2 be distinct base orders for Q . Then≪1 and≪2 overlap if and only if ≪2 = τc(≪1). In this case,
|SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2)| = 2

2n − 2
2n−1 − 1

.
Theorem 3 is not obvious, and it requires a fair amount of work to prove. Thus, we will begin by proving several useful
lemmas.
Definition 5. For any x ∈ X , the complement of x is the alternative x such that
xi = 1 if and only if xi = 0.
A binary preference order≪ is said to be symmetric provided that for all x, y ∈ S,
x ≪ y if and only if y ≪ x.
Note that a binary preference order ≪ is symmetric if and only if, for all x ∈ X, pos≪(x) = 2n + 1 − pos≪(x). The
following lemma, due to Bradley, Hodge, and Kilgour [3], establishes a relationship between separability and symmetry.
Lemma 2. Let ≪ be a binary preference order for Q . If ≪ is separable, then≪ is symmetric.
Note that Definition 3 and Lemma 2 together imply that every base order is symmetric.
Definition 6. Let≪be a binary preference order forQ and let x, y, z ∈ X . Then y is said to be≪-between x and z if x ≪ y ≪ z
or z ≪ y ≪ x.
Lemma 3. Let≪1 and≪2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1)∩SP(≪2)with peak
x∗. Then an alternative y ∈ X is≪1-between x∗ and x∗ if and only if y is≪2-between x∗ and x∗.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an alternative y ∈ X that is≪1-between x∗ and x∗ but not≪2-between x∗
and x∗. Without loss of generality, assume that x∗≪1 y≪1 x∗. By symmetry, it is also the case that x∗≪1 y≪1 x∗. Since ≺
is single-peaked with respect to≪1, it follows that
x∗ ≺ y and x∗ ≺ y. (9)
Since y is not≪2-between x∗ and x∗, one of the following must be true:
(i) y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y
(ii) y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y
(iii) y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y
(iv) y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y.
In each of these cases, the fact that ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪2 requires that either y ≺ x∗ or y ≺ x∗, a
contradiction to (9).
Lemma 3 implies the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. Let ≪1 and≪2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2) with
peak x∗. Then either pos1(x∗) = pos2(x∗) or pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) = 2n + 1− pos1(x∗).
Proof. Lemma 3 implies that the number of elements that are≪1-between x∗ and x∗ is the same as the number of elements
that are≪2-between x∗ and x∗. The result then follows from the fact that both≪1 and≪2 are symmetric (by Lemma 2).
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Corollary 2. Let ≪1 and≪2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2) with
peak x∗. Suppose also that pos1(x∗) = pos2(x∗). If an alternative y ∈ X is both≪1-between and≪2-between x∗ and x∗, then
pos1(y) = pos2(y).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that pos1(x∗) = pos2(x∗) and pos1(y) ≠ pos2(y). Then, by Lemma 3, theremust exist z ∈ X
such that one of the following holds:
(i) x∗≪1 y≪1 z≪1 x∗ and x∗≪2 z≪2 y≪2 x∗
(ii) x∗≪1 z≪1 y≪1 x∗ and x∗≪2 y≪2 z≪2 x∗
(iii) x∗≪1 y≪1 z≪1 x∗ and x∗≪2 z≪2 y≪1 x∗
(iv) x∗≪1 z≪1 y≪1 x∗ and x∗≪2 y≪1 z≪2 x∗.
In each of these cases, the fact that≺ is single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2 implies that both y ≺ z and z ≺ y,
a contradiction.
In the next lemma (and subsequent results), we will use the notation a ≪ b, c ≪ d to denote that a ≪ b ≪ d and
a ≪ c ≪ d.
Lemma 4. Let≪1 and≪2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1)∩SP(≪2)with peak
x∗. Suppose there exists y ∈ X such that
y≪1 x∗, x∗≪1 y
and
y≪2 x∗, x∗≪2 y.
Then pos2(y) = pos1(y) = 2n + 1− pos1(y).
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that pos2(y) ≠ pos1(y). Lemma 3 implies that there exists z ∈ X such that one of the
following is true:
(i) y≪1 z≪1 x∗, x∗≪1 z≪1 y and z≪2 y≪2 x∗, x∗≪2 y≪2 z
(ii) y≪1 z≪1 x∗, x∗≪1 z≪1 y and z≪2 y≪2 x∗, x∗≪2 y≪2 z
(iii) z≪1 y≪1 x∗, x∗≪1 y≪1 z and y≪2 z≪2 x∗, x∗≪2 z≪2 y
(iv) z≪1 y≪1 x∗, x∗≪1 y≪1 z and y≪2 z≪2 x∗, x∗≪2 z≪2 y.
Recall that≺ is single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2.
If (i) holds, then y ≺ z ≺ y (since y≪1 z≪1 x∗ and z≪2 y≪2 x∗) and y ≺ z ≺ y (since x∗≪1 z≪1 y and x∗≪2 y≪2 z).
This, however, is a contradiction. Likewise, if (iii) holds, we obtain z ≺ y ≺ z and z ≺ y ≺ z.
If (ii) holds, then we have y ≺ z (since y≪1 z≪1 x∗) and z ≺ y (since x∗≪2 y≪2 z). Similarly, if (iv) holds, then y ≺ z
(since x∗≪2 z≪2 y) and z ≺ y (since z≪1 y≪1 x∗).
Since we obtain a contradiction in each of these four cases, it must be that pos2(y) = pos1(y).
Lemma 5. Let≪1 and≪2 be overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1)∩SP(≪2)with peak
x∗. Suppose y ∈ X such that one of the following holds:
(i) y≪1 x∗≪1 x∗ and y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗
(ii) y≪1 x∗≪1 x∗ and y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗
(iii) x∗≪1 x∗≪1 y and x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y
(iv) x∗≪1 x∗≪1 y and x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y.
Then pos1(y) = pos2(y).
Proof. We will prove the result assuming (i). A similar argument establishes each of the other cases. Thus, assume that
y≪1 x∗≪1 x∗ (10)
and
y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗. (11)
Suppose, to the contrary, that pos1(y) ≠ pos2(y). Without loss of generality, assume that pos1(y) < pos2(y).
Since≺ is single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2, there does not exist z ∈ X such that
z≪2 y≪2 x∗ and y≪1 z≪1 x∗.
(If there were such a z, then Definition 1 would imply that both z ≺ y and y ≺ z.) Therefore, for each z ∈ X such that
z≪2 y≪2 x∗, either z≪1 y or z≫1 x∗. Symmetry then implies that
for all z≪2 y, either z≪1 y or z≪1 x∗. (12)
We will now prove the following claim.
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Claim. If z≪2 y≪2 x∗ and z≪1 x∗, then z≪1 y.
Suppose z≪2 y≪2 x∗ and z≪1 x∗. (Recall that we also assumed in (10) that y≪1 x∗≪1 x∗.) Then one of the following
must be true:
(i) y≪1 x∗≪1 z≪1 x∗
(ii) y≪1 z≪1 x∗≪1 x∗
(iii) z≪1 y≪1 x∗≪1 x∗.
If y≪1 x∗≪1 z≪1 x∗, then since ≺ is single-peaked with respect to ≪1, x∗ ≺ z. But we assumed that z≪2 y≪2 x∗.
Therefore, by symmetry and the fact that x∗≪2 x∗ (by (11)), it follows that x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y≪2 z. But≺ is single-peaked with
respect to≪2, and so it must be that z ≺ x∗, a contradiction since we argued earlier that x∗ ≺ z.
If y≪1 z≪1 x∗≪1 x∗, then by symmetry, x∗≪1 x∗≪1 z≪1 y. Also, by symmetry and the assumption that z≪2 y≪2 x∗
(and x∗≪2 x∗), it follows that x∗≪2 y≪2 z. Since≺ is single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2, Definition 1 implies
that y ≺ z ≺ y (since x∗≪1 z≪1 y and z≪2 y≪2 x∗) and y ≺ z ≺ y (since y≪1 z≪1 x∗ and x∗≪2 y≪2 z), a contradiction.
Since both (i) and (ii) lead to a contradiction, it must be that (iii) holds—in particular, z≪1 y. Thus, our claim is true.
Recall from (12) that for each z ∈ X such that z≪2 y≪2 x∗, either z≪1 y or z≪1 x∗. Combining this fact with the claim
we just proved, we see that for each z ∈ X such that z≪2 y≪2 x∗, either z≪1 y or z≪1 y. This, however, implies that
|X≪1(y)| ≥ |X≪2(y)|, a contradiction to the assumption that pos1(y) < pos2(y). Therefore, pos1(y) = pos2(y), as desired.
For the purposes of the next lemma, we will call an alternative y ∈ X a bottom alternative for≪ if pos≪(y) ≤ 2n−1.
Likewise, we will call y ∈ X a top alternative for≪ if pos≪(y) > 2n−1. Note that y is a bottom alternative if and only if y is a
top alternative.
Definition 7. Let≪1 and≪2 be binary preference orders for Q . Then≪1 and≪2 are said to be complementary if for each
y ∈ X , either pos2(y) = pos1(y) or pos2(y) = pos1(y) = 2n + 1− pos1(y).
Note that if ≪1 and ≪2 are complementary base orders, then ≪1 and ≪2 differ at most by transpositions of
complementary alternatives. Furthermore, if y ∈ X is a bottom (or top) alternative for both≪1 and≪2, then pos1(y) =
pos2(y).
Complementarity induces an equivalence relation on the set of all binary preference orders for Q . Furthermore, every
order≪ is, by definition, complementary with its inverse≫. These observations yield the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let ≪1 and≪2 be binary preference orders for Q . Then≪1 and≪2 are complementary if and only if ≪1 and≫2
are complementary.
The next lemma establishes an important structural property of overlapping base orders.
Lemma 7. Let ≪1 and≪2 be overlapping base orders for Q . Then≪1 and≪2 are complementary.
Proof. Suppose≪1 and≪2 overlap, and let≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2)with peak x∗. By Corollary 1,
if pos2(x∗) ≠ pos1(x∗), then pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) = 2n + 1 − pos1(x∗). Thus, we may assume, without loss of generality,
that pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗). (If this is not the case, then a similar argument establishes that≫1 and≪2 are complementary,
which is equivalent to what we need to show.)3 For all y ∈ X with y ≠ x∗, y satisfies the hypotheses of either Corollary 2,
Lemma 4, or Lemma 5. Therefore, for all y ∈ X, pos2(y) = pos1(y) or pos2(y) = pos1(y) = 2n + 1− pos1(y), as desired.
Lemma 8. Let ≪1 and≪2 be complementary base orders for Q . Then there do not exist x, y ∈ X such that
y≪1 x, x≪1 y (13)
and
y≪2 x, x≪2 y. (14)
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there do exist x, y ∈ X such that both (13) and (14) hold.
Let S = {i ∈ Q : xi = yi}. (Note that S is the set of criteria on which x and y agree.) Since x and y are distinct and not
complements of each other, S is a nonempty, proper subset of Q . Furthermore, there exist uS, v−S such that
x = (uS, v−S)
x = (uS, v−S)
y = (uS, v−S)
y = (uS, v−S).
3 Technically,≫1 is not a base order (as defined in Definition 3), in that≫1 is not normalized. However, Corollary 2 and Lemmas 4 and 5 are all still
valid even without the assumption of normalization, as their proofs rely only on symmetry.
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By (13),
(uS, v−S)≪1(uS, v−S), (uS, v−S)≪1(uS, v−S). (15)
By (14),
(uS, v−S)≪2(uS, v−S), (uS, v−S)≪2(uS, v−S). (16)
Since both≪1 is separable, we can replace uS with any other outcome zS in (15) to obtain
(zS, v−S)≪1(zS, v−S) for all zS . (17)
By similar arguments, it follows that:
(uS, w−S)≪1(uS, w−S) for allw−S (18)
(zS, v−S)≪2(zS, v−S) for all zS (19)
(uS, w−S)≪2(uS, w−S) for allw−S . (20)
Now consider two cases.
Case 1: (uS, 1−S) is a top alternative for≪1. Now the normalization of≪2 implies that (uS, 0−S)≪2(uS, 1−S). From this
fact and (20), it follows that
(uS, 0−S)≪2(uS, 0−S)≪2(uS, 1−S).
Thus, (uS, 1−S) is a top alternative for both≪1 and≪2. Since≪1 and≪2 are complementary, itmust be that pos1(uS, 1−S) =
pos2(uS, 1−S) or pos1(uS, 1−S) = 2n + 1− pos2(uS, 1−S). However, since (uS, 1−S) is a top alternative for both≪1 and≪2,
it must be that pos1(uS, 1−S) = pos2(uS, 1−S).
Furthermore, since (uS, 1−S)≪1(uS, 1−S) (by (18)), (uS, 1−S)≪2(uS, 1−S) (by (20)), and pos1(uS, 1−S) = pos2(uS, 1−S),
we can conclude that pos1(uS, 1−S) ≠ pos2(uS, 1−S). It follows by complementarity that pos1(uS, 1−S) = pos2(uS, 0−S).
Thus, recalling that (uS, 1−S)≪1(uS, 1−S), we have
pos2(uS, 0−S) = pos1(uS, 1−S) > pos1(uS, 1−S) = pos2(uS, 1−S),
and so (uS, 1−S)≪2(uS, 0−S). This, however, is a contradiction to the fact that≪2 is normalized.
Case 2: (uS, 1−S) is a bottom alternative for≪1. Then (uS, 0−S) is a top alternative for≪1. Since≪1 is normalized,
(uS, 0−S)≤≤1(1S, 0−S)≤≤1(1S, v−S),
and so (1S, v−S) is also a top alternative for≪1. By (19) and the normalization of≪2,
(0S, v−S)≪2(1S, v−S)≪2(1S, v−S).
Thus, (1S, v−S) is a top alternative for both ≪1 and ≪2, which implies (by complementarity, as in Case 1) that
pos1(1S, v−S) = pos2(1S, v−S). By (17), (1S, v−S)≪1(1S, v−S). But, as noted above, (19) implies that (1S, v−S)≪2(1S, v−S).
Thus, it must be the case that pos1(1S, v−S) ≠ pos2(1S, v−S), and so (by complementarity) pos1(1S, v−S) = pos2(0S, v−S).
It follows (recalling from (17) that (1S, v−S)≪1(1S, v−S)) that
pos2(0S, v−S) = pos1(1S, v−S) > pos1(1S, v−S) = pos2(1S, v−S),
and so (1S, v−S)≪2(0S, v−S), a contradiction to the normalization of≪2.
Lemma 9. Let ≪1 and≪2 be distinct overlapping base orders for Q , and let ≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2)
with peak x∗. Then
pos1(x
∗), pos2(x∗) ∈ {2n−1, 2n−1 + 1}.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that pos1(x∗) ∉ {2n−1, 2n−1 + 1} or pos2(x∗) ∉ {2n−1, 2n−1 + 1}. Then pos1(x∗) <
2n−1, pos1(x∗) > 2n−1 + 1, pos2(x∗) < 2n−1, or pos2(x∗) > 2n−1 + 1. Assume, without loss of generality, that pos1(x∗) <
2n−1. Then, by symmetry, pos1(x∗) > 2n−1 + 1. Furthermore, Corollary 1 implies that either pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) or
pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) = 2n + 1− pos1(x∗). Consider these two cases.
Case 1: pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) < 2n−1. Since≪1 and≪2 are complementary (by Lemma 7) and≪1 ≠ ≪2, there exists
y ∈ X such that pos2(y) = pos1(y). By Lemma 3 and Corollary 2, y is neither ≪1-between nor ≪2-between x∗ and x∗.
Without loss of generality, assume that y≪1 x∗. Then
y≪1 x∗≪1 x∗≪1 y
and
y≪2 x∗≪2 x∗≪2 y.
This, however, is a contradiction to Lemma 8.
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Case 2: pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) = 2n + 1 − pos1(x∗). Then pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗). Since we assumed that pos1(x∗) < 2n−1,
there must exist y ∈ X such that
x∗≪1 y, y≪1 x∗.
In other words, both y and y are≪1-between x∗ and x∗. By Lemma 3, y and y are also≪2-between x∗ and x∗. But then our
assumption that pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) implies that
x∗≪2 y, y≪2 x∗,
a contradiction to Lemma 8.
Since each case leads to a contradiction, our assumption that pos1(x∗) ∉ {2n−1, 2n−1+ 1} or pos2(x∗) ∉ {2n−1, 2n−1+ 1}
must be false. Thus,
pos1(x
∗), pos2(x∗) ∈ {2n−1, 2n−1 + 1},
as desired.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let≪1 and≪2 be distinct base orders for Q . For the forward implication, suppose that≪1 and≪2
overlap, and let≺ be a single-peaked order in SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2)with peak x∗. By Lemma 9,
pos1(x
∗), pos2(x∗) ∈ {2n−1, 2n−1 + 1}.
This, however, implies that
pos1(x∗), pos2(x∗) ∈ {2n−1, 2n−1 + 1}
aswell. By Lemma 7,≪1 and≪2 are complementary. Thus, for each y ∈ X , either pos2(y) = pos1(y) or pos2(y) = pos1(y) =
2n + 1− pos1(y).
Now suppose y ∉ {x∗, x∗}, and assume without loss of generality that y≪1 x∗. If pos2(y) = pos1(y), then
y≪1 x∗, x∗≪1 y
and
y≪2 x∗, x∗≪2 y,
a contradiction to Lemma 8. Thus, it must be the case that pos1(y) = pos2(y) for all y ∉ {x∗, x∗}. Since≪1 ≠ ≪2, it follows
that pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗) (and pos2(x∗) = pos1(x∗)). Thus,≪2 = τc(≪1).
For the reverse implication, suppose≪2 = τc(≪2). Label the elements xi of X so that
x1≪1 x2≪1 · · ·≪1 x2n−1 ≪1 x2n−1+1≪1 x2n−1+2≪1 · · ·≪1 x2n−1≪1 x2n
and
x1≪2 x2≪2 · · ·≪2 x2n−1+1≪2 x2n−1 ≪2 x2n−1+2≪2 · · ·≪2 x2n−1≪2 x2n .
Then let≺ be the binary preference order defined by
x1 ≺ x2 ≺ · · · ≺ x2n−1−1 ≺ x2n ≺ x2n−1 ≺ · · · ≺ x2n−1+1 ≺ x2n−1 .
Then≺ is single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2, and so≪1 and≪2 overlap.
To count all such single-peaked orders, we first note that if ≺ is single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2, then
x∗ ∈ {x2n−1 , x2n−1+1}. If this is not the case, then x∗ = xi for some i < 2n−1 or i > 2n−1 + 1. In either case, Definition 1
requires both x2n−1 ≺ x2n−1+1 and x2n−1+1 ≺ x2n−1 , a contradiction. Thus, x∗ ∈ {x2n−1 , x2n−1+1}.
Suppose x∗ = x2n−1 , and let x′ ∈ X be the secondmost preferred alternativewith respect to≺. (That is, pos≺(x′) = 2n−1.)
Since≺ is single-peaked with respect to≪1 and x∗ = x2n−1 , x′ must be one of the two alternatives immediately preceding
or succeeding x2n−1 with respect to≪1. Thus,
x′ = x2n−1−1 or x′ = x2n−1+1.
But≺ is also single-peaked with respect to≪2, and so
x′ = x2n−1+1 or x′ = x2n−1+2.
Therefore, it must be that x′ = x2n−1+1.
Once x∗ and x′ are determined, all of the remaining alternatives are ordered identically—both with respect to each other
and with respect to x∗ and x′—by≪1 and≪2. Therefore, any assignment of these alternatives to the remaining 2n − 2 ≺-
positions that satisfies
x1 ≺ x2 ≺ · · · ≺ x2n−1−1
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and
x2n ≺ x2n−1 ≺ · · · ≺ x2n−1+2
will yield a preference order that is single-peaked with respect to both ≪1 and ≪2. Any such assignment is uniquely
determined by the ≺-positions assigned to the alternatives x1, x2, . . . , x2n−1−1 (as in the proof of Theorem 2). Thus, there
are

2n−2
2n−1−1

different orders that are single-peaked with respect to both≪1 and≪2, and that have peak x2n−1 . A similar
argument yields the same result when x∗ = x2n−1+1. Therefore,
|SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2)| = 2

2n − 2
2n−1 − 1

.
Having established Theorem 3, we can now prove our main result. Our proof relies on the following lemma, which is
adapted from Hodge [8].
Lemma 10. Let ≪ be a base order for Q . Then τc(≪) is also a base order for Q .
Theorem 4. Let |Q | = n, let pn denote the number of base orders for Q , and let SPn denote the set of all single-peaked preference
orders for Q . Then
|SPn| = pn

22
n−1 −

2n − 2
2n−1 − 1

.
Proof. Theorem 2 establishes |SP(≪)| for any base order≪. By Lemma 10, there are pn/2 pairs of base orders (say≪1 and
≪2) such that≪2 = τc(≪1). Furthermore, Theorem3 states that≪1 and≪2 overlap if and only if≪2 = τc(≪1). Theorem3
also establishes |SP(≪1) ∩ SP(≪2)| for each such overlapping pair. Thus, by the Principle of Inclusion–Exclusion,
|SPn| = pn · 22n−1 − pn2 · 2

2n − 2
2n−1 − 1

= pn

22
n−1 −

2n − 2
2n−1 − 1

.
The table below lists the number of base orders and single-peaked orders for 2 ≤ n ≤ 4.
n # of base orders |SPn|
2 2 12
3 12 1,296
4 336 9,856,896
It is worth noting that the first three terms in the |SPn| sequence do not correspond to any entries in the Online
Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences [15]. It is also worth noting that since the minimal element of any single-peaked
preference order is either 0Q or 1Q—a significant restriction—it is easy to show that the proportion of preference orders that
are single-peaked approaches zero asymptotically as n increases. In contrast, Hodge and TerHaar [12] have shown that the
proportion of preference orders that are completely nonseparable approaches 1 asymptotically. Thus, while single-peaked
preferences are almost always nonseparable (by Theorem 1), single-peakedness cannot be claimed to fully account for—or
even to account for in any significant way—the presence of nonseparability within multidimensional binary preferences.
6. Summary and future research
Single-peaked preferences are important and interesting, both for their practical applications and for the mathematical
questions pertaining to them. In this article, we developed a model of single-peaked preferences over multidimensional
binary alternative spaces. This model generalizes the notion of cost-consciousness proposed by Golenbiewski et al. [7] in
the context of voting on referendum elections, but it may have other applications as well. (Consider, for instance, arranging
political candidates on a left–right spectrum according to their views—liberal or conservative—on a number of issues.)
The majority of our work focused on counting single-peaked preference orders. This problem may not have as many
practical implications as some others, but it is interesting from amathematical point of view.Moreover, the relative rarity of
single-peaked preferences suggests the need to further model the causes of nonseparability, particularly within the context
of referendum elections.
Our results focused on preferences that are single-peaked with respect to a normalized, separable total order. These
conditions could be relaxed in future work. For instance, conditions related to but not equivalent to separability—such as
additivity—may be of significance in some applications. In addition, allowing alternative spaces to beweakly ordered, rather
than totally ordered, would potentially provide a more flexible and robust model, while also giving rise to a number of
interesting combinatorial questions.
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